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Abstract
We present a practical, differentially private algorithm for answering a large number of queries on
high dimensional datasets. Like all algorithms for this task, ours necessarily has worst-case complexity
exponential in the dimension of the data. However, our algorithm packages the computationally hard step
into a concisely defined integer program, which can be solved non-privately using standard solvers. We
prove accuracy and privacy theorems for our algorithm, and then demonstrate experimentally that our
algorithm performs well in practice. For example, our algorithm can efficiently and accurately answer
millions of queries on the Netflix dataset, which has over 17,000 attributes; this is an improvement on
the state of the art by multiple orders of magnitude.
1 Introduction
Privacy is becoming a paramount concern for machine learning and data analysis tasks, which often op-
erate on personal data. For just one example of the tension between machine learning and data privacy,
Netflix released an anonymized dataset of user movie ratings for teams competing to develop an improved
recommendation mechanism. The competition was a great success (the winning team improved on the ex-
isting recommendation system by more than 10%), but the ad hoc anonymization was not as successful:
Narayanan and Shmatikov [28] were later able to re-identify individuals in the dataset, leading to a lawsuit
and the cancellation of subsequent competitions.
Differentially private query release is an attempt to solve this problem. Differential privacy is a strong
formal privacy guarantee (that, among other things, provably prevents re-identification attacks), and the
problem of query release is to release accurate answers to a set of statistical queries. As observed early on
by Blum et al. [5], performing private query release is sufficient to simulate any learning algorithm in the
statistical query model of Kearns [23].
Since then, the query release problem has been extensively studied in the differential privacy litera-
ture. While simple perturbation can privately answer a small number of queries [14], more sophisticated
approaches can accurately answer nearly exponentially many queries in the size of the private database
[4, 12, 13, 31, 19, 17, 20]. A natural approach, employed by many of these algorithms, is to answer queries
by generating synthetic data: a safe version of the dataset that approximates the real dataset on every statis-
tical query of interest.
Unfortunately, even the most efficient approaches for query release have a per-query running time linear
in the size of the data universe—the number of possible kinds of records. If each record is specified by a
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set of attributes, the size of the data universe is exponential in the number of attributes [19]. Moreover, this
running time is necessary in the worst case [35, 36].
This exponential runtime has hampered practical evaluation of query release algorithms. One notable
exception is due to Hardt et al. [20], who perform a thorough experimental evaluation of one such algorithm,
which they called MWEM (Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism). They find that MWEM has
quite good accuracy in practice and scales to higher dimensional data than suggested by a theoretical (worst-
case) analysis. Nevertheless, running time remains a problem, and the approach does not seem to scale to
high dimensional data (with more than 30 or so attributes for general queries, and more when the queries
have more structure1). The critical bottleneck is the size of the state maintained by the algorithm: MWEM,
like many query release algorithms, needs to manipulate an object that has size linear in the size of the data
universe. This quickly becomes impractical for records with even a modest number of attributes.
We present DualQuery, an alternative algorithm which is dual to MWEM in a sense that we will make
precise. Rather than manipulating an object of exponential size, DualQuery solves a concisely represented
(but NP-hard) optimization problem. Critically, the optimization step does not require a solution that is
private or exact, so it can be handled by existing, highly optimized solvers. Except for this step, all parts
of our algorithm are efficient. As a result, DualQuery requires (worst-case) space and (in practice) time
only linear in the number of queries of interest, which is often significantly smaller than the size of the data
universe. Like existing algorithms for query release, DualQuery has a provable accuracy guarantee and
satisfies the strong differential privacy guarantee. Both DualQuery and MWEM generate synthetic data:
the output of both algorithms is a data set from the same domain as the input data set, and can thus be
used as the original data set would have been used. It is important to note that the that the output data set is
guaranteed to be similar to the input data set only with respect to the query class; the synthetic data might
not be similar to the real data in other respects.
We evaluate DualQuery on a variety of datasets by releasing 3-way marginals (also known as conjunc-
tions or contingency tables), demonstrating that it solves the query release problem accurately and efficiently
even when the data includes hundreds of thousands of features. We know of no other algorithm that can per-
form accurate, private query release for this class of queries on real data with more than even 100 features.
Related work
Differentially private learning has been studied since Blum et al. [5] showed how to convert learning algo-
rithms in the SQ model of Kearns [23] into differentially private learning algorithms with similar accuracy
guarantees. Since then, private machine learning has become a very active field with both foundational
sample complexity results [22, 6, 3, 11] and numerous efficient algorithms for particular learning problems
[7, 9, 32, 24, 10, 33].
In parallel, there has been a significant amount of work on privately releasing synthetic data based
on a true dataset while preserving the answers to large numbers of statistical queries [4, 12, 31, 13, 19,
17]. These results are extremely strong in an information theoretic sense: they ensure the consistency of
the synthetic data with respect to an exponentially large family of statistics. But, all of these algorithms
(including the notable multiplicative weights algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [19], which achieves the
theoretically optimal accuracy and runtime) have running time exponential in the dimension of the data.
Under standard cryptographic assumptions, this is necessary in the worst case for mechanisms that answer
arbitrary statistical queries [35].
1Hardt et al. [20] are able to scale up to 1000 features on synthetic data when the features are partitioned into a number of small
buckets, and the queries depend on at most one feature per bucket.
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Nevertheless, there have been some experimental evaluations of these approaches on real datasets. Most
related to our work is the evaluation of the MWEM mechanism by Hardt et al. [20], which is based on the
private multiplicative weights mechanism [19]. This algorithm is inefficient—it manipulates a probability
distribution over a set exponentially large in the dimension of the data space—but with some heuristic
optimizations, Hardt et al. [20] were able to implement the multiplicative weights algorithm on real datasets
with up to 77 attributes (and even more when the queries are restricted to take positive values only on a
small number of disjoint groups of features). However, it seems difficult to scale this approach to higher
dimensional data.
Another family of query release algorithms are based on the Matrix Mechanism [26, 25]. The runtime
guarantees of the matrix mechanism are similar to the approaches based on multiplicative weights—the al-
gorithm manipulates a “matrix” of queries with dimension exponential in the number of features. Yaroslavt-
sev et al. [37] evaluate an approach based on this family of algorithms on low dimensional datasets, but
scaling to high dimensional data also seems challenging. A recent work by Zhang et al. [38] proposes a
low-dimensional approximation for high-dimensional data distribution by privately constructing Bayesian
networks, and shows that such a representation gives good accuracy on some real datasets.
Our algorithm is inspired by the view of the synthetic data generation problem as a zero-sum game,
first proposed by Hsu et al. [21]. In this interpretation, Hardt et al. [20] solves the game by having a data
player use a no-regret learning algorithm, while the query player repeatedly best responds by optimizing
over queries. In contrast, our algorithm swaps the roles of the two players: the query player now uses the
no-regret learning algorithm, whereas the data player now finds best responses by solving an optimization
problem. This is reminiscent of “Boosting for queries,” proposed by Dwork et al. [13]; the main difference is
that our optimization problem is over single records rather than sets of records. As a result, our optimization
can be handled non-privately.
There is also another theoretical approach to query release due to Nikolov, Talwar, and Zhang (and
later specialized to marginals by Dwork, Nikolov, and Talwar) that shares a crucial property of the one we
present here—namely that the computationally difficult step does not need to be solved privately [30, 15].
The benefit of our approach is that it yields synthetic data rather than just query answers, and that the number
of calls to the optimization oracle is smaller. However, the approach of Nikolov et al. [30], Dwork et al. [15]
yields theoretically optimal accuracy bounds (ours does not), and so that approach certainly merits future
empirical evaluation.
2 Differential privacy background
Differential privacy has become a standard algorithmic notion for protecting the privacy of individual records
in a statistical database. It formalizes the requirement that the addition or removal of a data record does not
change the probability of any outcome of the mechanism by much.
To begin, databases are multisets of elements from an abstract domain X , representing the set of all
possible data records. Two databases D,D′ ⊂ X are neighboring if they differ in a single data element
(|D4D′| ≤ 1).
Definition 2.1 (Dwork et al. [14]). A mechanism M : X n → R satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for
every S ⊆ R and for all neighboring databases D,D′ ∈ X n, the following holds:
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ
If δ = 0 we say M satisfies ε-differential privacy.
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Definition 2.2. The (global) sensitivity of a query q is its maximum difference when evaluated on two
neighboring databases:
GSf = max
D,D′∈Xn:|D4D′|=1
|q(D)− q(D′)|.
In this paper, we consider the private release of information for the classes of linear queries, which have
sensitivity 1/n.
Definition 2.3. For a predicate ϕ : X → {0, 1}, the linear query qϕ : X n → [0, 1] is defined by
qϕ(D) =
∑
x∈D ϕ(x)
|D| .
We will often represent linear queries a different form, as a vector q ∈ {0, 1}|X | explicitly encoding the
predicate φ:
q(D) =
∑
x∈D qx
|D| .
We will use a fundamental tool for private data analysis: we can bound the privacy cost of an algorithm
as a function of the privacy costs of its subcomponents.
Lemma 2.4 (Dwork et al. [13]). Let M1, . . . ,Mk be such that each Mi is (εi, 0)-private with εi ≤ ε′. Then
M(D) = (M1(D), . . . ,Mk(D)) is (ε, 0)-private for ε =
∑k
i=1 εi, and (ε, δ)-private for
ε =
√
2 log(1/δ)kε′ + kε′(eε
′ − 1)
for any δ ∈ (0, 1). The sequence of mechanisms can be chosen adaptively, i.e., later mechanisms can take
outputs from previous mechanisms as input.
3 The query release game
The analysis of our algorithm relies on the interpretation of query release as a two player, zero-sum game [21].
In the present section, we review this idea and related tools.
Game definition
Suppose we want to answer a set of queries Q. For each query q ∈ Q, we can form the negated query q,
which takes values q(D) = 1 − q(D) for every database D. Equivalently, for a linear query defined by a
predicate ϕ, the negated query is defined by the negation ¬ϕ of the predicate. For the remainder, we will
assume that Q is closed under negation; if not, we may add negated copies of each query to Q.
Let there be two players, whom we call the data player and query player. The data player has action set
equal to the data universe X , while the query player has action set equal to the query class Q. Given a play
x ∈ X and q ∈ Q, we let the payoff be
A(x, q) := q(D)− q(x), (1)
where D is the true database. To define the zero-sum game, the data player will try to minimize the payoff,
while the query player will try to maximize the payoff.
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Equilibrium of the game
Let ∆(X ) and ∆(Q) be the set of probability distributions over X andQ. We consider how well each player
can do if they randomize over their actions, i.e., if they play from a probability distribution over their actions.
By von Neumann’s minimax theorem,
min
u∈∆(X )
max
w∈∆(Q)
A(u,w) = max
w∈∆(Q)
min
u∈∆(X )
A(u,w),
for any two player zero-sum game, where
A(u,w) := Ex∼u,q∼wA(x, q)
is the expected payoff. The common value is called the value of the game, which we denote by vA.
Intuitively, von Neumann’s theorem states that there is no advantage in a player going first: the minimiz-
ing player can always force payoff at most vA, while the maximizing player can always force payoff at least
vA. This suggests that each player can play an optimal strategy, assuming best play from the opponent—
this is the notion of equilibrium strategies, which we now define. We will soon interpret these strategies as
solutions to the query release problem.
Definition 3.1. Let α > 0. Let A be the payoffs for a two player, zero-sum game with action sets X ,Q.
Then, a pair of strategies u∗ ∈ ∆(X ) and w∗ ∈ ∆(Q) form an α-approximate mixed Nash equilibrium if
A(u∗, w) ≤ vA + α and A(u,w∗) ≥ vA − α
for all strategies u ∈ ∆(X ) and w ∈ ∆(Q).
If the true database D is normalized to be a distribution D̂ in ∆(X ), then D̂ always has zero payoff:
A(D̂, w) = E
x∼D̂,q∼w[q(D)− q(x)] = 0.
Hence, the value of the game vA is at most 0. Also, for any data strategy u, the payoff of query q is the
negated payoff of the negated query q:
A(u, q) = Ex∼u[q(D)− q(x)] = Ex∼u[q(x)− q(D)],
which is A(u, q). Thus, any query strategy that places equal weight on q and q has expected payoff zero, so
vA is at least 0. Hence, vA = 0.
Now, let (u∗, w∗) be an α-approximate equilibrium. Suppose that the data player plays u∗, while the
query player always plays query q. By the equilibrium guarantee, we then have A(u∗, q) ≤ α, but the
expected payoff on the left is simply q(D)− q(u∗). Likewise, if the query player plays the negated query q,
then
−q(D) + q(u∗) = A(u∗, q) ≤ α,
so q(D)− q(u∗) ≥ −α. Hence for every query q ∈ Q, we know |q(u∗)− q(D)| ≤ α. This is precisely what
we need for query release: we just need to privately calculate an approximate equilibrium.
5
Algorithm 1 The Multiplicative Weights Algorithm
Let η > 0 be given, let A be the action space
Initialize A˜1 uniform distribution on A
For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
Receive loss vector `t
For each a ∈ A:
Update At+1a = e
−η`taA˜ta for every a ∈ A
Normalize A˜t+1 = A
t+1∑
i A
t+1
i
Solving the game
To construct the approximate equilibrium, we will use the multiplicative weights update algorithm (MW).2
This algorithm maintains a distribution over actions (initially uniform) over a series of steps. At each step, the
MW algorithm receives a (possibly adversarial) loss for each action. Then, MW reweights the distribution
to favor actions with less loss. The algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
For our purposes, the most important application of MW is to solving zero-sum games. Freund and
Schapire [16] showed that if one player maintains a distribution over actions using MW, while the other
player selects a best-response action versus the current MW distribution (i.e., an action that maximizes his
expected payoff), the average MW distribution and empirical best-response distributions will converge to an
approximate equilibrium rapidly.
Theorem 3.2 (Freund and Schapire [16]). Let α > 0, and let A(i, j) ∈ [−1, 1]m×n be the payoff matrix for
a zero-sum game. Suppose the first player uses multiplicative weights over their actions to play distributions
p1, . . . , pT , while the second player plays (α/2)-approximate best responses x1, . . . , xT , i.e.,
A(xt, pt) ≥ max
x
A(x, pt)− α/2.
Setting T = 16 log n/α2 and η = α/4 in the MW algorithm, the empirical distributions
1
T
T∑
i=1
pi and
1
T
T∑
i=1
xi
form an α-approximate mixed Nash equilibrium.
4 Dual query release
Viewing query release as a zero-sum game, we can interpret the algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [19] (and
the MWEM algorithm of Hardt et al. [20]) as solving the game by using MW for the data player, while
the query player plays best responses. To guarantee privacy, their algorithm selects the query best-responses
privately via the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [27]. Our algorithm simply reverses the
roles: while MWEM uses a no-regret algorithm to maintain the data player’s distribution, we will instead
use a no-regret algorithm for the query player’s distribution; instead of finding a maximum payoff query at
each round, our algorithm selects a minimum payoff record at each turn.
2The MW algorithm has wide applications; it has been rediscovered in various guises several times. More details can be found
in the comprehensive survey by Arora et al. [1].
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In a bit more detail, we maintain a distribution Q over the queries, initially uniform. At each step t, we
first simulate the data player making a best response against Q, i.e., selecting a record xt that maximizes
the expected payoff if the query player draws a query according to Q. As we discuss below, for privacy
considerations we cannot work directly with the distribution Q. Instead, we sample s queries {qi} from Q,
and form “average” query q˜, which we take as an estimate of the true distribution Q. The data player then
best-responds against q˜.
Then, we simulate the query player updating the distribution Q after seeing the selected record xt—we
will reduce weight on queries that have similar answers on xt the database D, and we will increase weight
on queries that have very different answers on xt and D. After running for T rounds, we output the set of
records {xt}t as the synthetic database. Note that this is a data set from the same domain as the original
data set, and so can be used in any application that the original data set can be used in – with the caveat
of course, that except with respect to the query class used in the algorithm, there are no guarantees about
how the synthetic data resembles the real data. The full algorithm can be found in Algorithm 2; the main
parameters are α ∈ (0, 1), which is the target maximum additive error of any query on the final output,
and β ∈ (0, 1), which is the probability that the algorithm may fail to achieve the accuracy level α. These
parameters two control the number of steps we take (T ), the update rate of the query distribution (η), and
the number of queries we sample at each step (s).
Our privacy argument differs slightly from the analysis forMWEM. There, the data distribution is public,
and finding a query with high error requires access to the private data. Our algorithm instead maintains a
distribution Q over queries which depends directly on the private data, so we cannot use Q directly. Instead,
we argue that queries sampled from Q are privacy preserving. Then, we can use a non-private optimization
method to find a minimal error record versus queries sampled from Q. We then trade off privacy (which
degrades as we take more samples) with accuracy (which improves as we take more samples, since the
distribution of sampled queries converges to Q).
Given known hardness results for the query release problem [35], our algorithm must have worst-case
runtime polynomial in the universe size |X |, so is not theoretically more efficient than prior approaches. In
fact, even compared to prior work on query release (e.g., Hardt and Rothblum [19]), our algorithm has a
weaker accuracy guarantee. However, our approach has an important practical benefit: the computationally
hard step can be handled with standard, non-private solvers (we note that this is common also to the approach
of [30, 15]).
The iterative structure of our algorithm, combined with our use of constraint solvers, also allows for
several heuristics improvements. For instance, we may run for fewer iterations than predicted by theory.
Or, if the optimization problem turns out to be hard (even in practice), we can stop the solver early at a
suboptimal (but often still good) solution. These heuristic tweaks can improve accuracy beyond what is
guaranteed by our accuracy theorem, while always maintaining a strong provable privacy guarantee.
Privacy
The privacy proofs are largely routine, based on the composition theorems. Rather than fixing ε and solving
for the other parameters as is typical in the literature, we present the privacy cost ε as function of parameters
T, s, η. This form will lead to simpler tuning of the parameters in our experimental evaluation.
We will use the privacy of the following mechanism (result due to McSherry and Talwar [27]) as an
ingredient in our privacy proof.
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Algorithm 2 DualQuery
Parameters: Target accuracy level α ∈ (0, 1), target failure probability β ∈ (0, 1).
Input: Database D ∈ R|X | (normalized) and linear queries q1, . . . , qk ∈ {0, 1}|X |.
Initialize: Let Q = ⋃kj=1 qj ∪ qj , Q1 be a uniform distribution on Q,
T =
16 log |Q|
α2
, η =
α
4
, and s =
48 log (2|X |T/β)
α2
.
Let the payoff function AD : X × [0, 1]|X | → R be:
AD(x, q˜) = q˜(D)− q˜(x), where q˜(D) = 1|D|
∑
x∈D
q˜x.
For t = 1, . . . , T :
Sample s queries {qi} from Q according to Qt.
Let q˜ := 1s
∑
i qi.
Find xt with AD(xt, q˜) ≥ maxxAD(x, q˜)− α/4.
Update: For each q ∈ Q:
Qt+1q := exp(−ηAD(xt, q)〉) ·Qtq.
Normalize Qt+1.
Output synthetic database D̂ :=
⋃T
t=1 x
t.
Lemma 4.1 (McSherry and Talwar [27]). Given some arbitrary output rangeR, the exponential mechanism
with score function S selects and outputs an element r ∈ R with probability proportional to
exp
(
εS(D, r)
2 ·GSS
)
,
where GSS is the sensitivity of S, defined as
GSS = max
D,D′:|D4D′|=1,r∈R
|S(D, r)− S(D′, r)|.
The exponential mechanism is ε-differentially private.
We first prove pure ε-differential privacy.
Theorem 4.2. DualQuery is ε-differentially private for
ε =
ηT (T − 1)s
n
.
Proof. We will argue that sampling from Qt is equivalent to running the exponential mechanism with some
quality score. At round t, let {xi} for i ∈ [t− 1] be the best responses for the previous rounds. Let r(D, q)
be defined by
r(D, q) =
t−1∑
i=1
(q(D)− q(xi)),
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where q ∈ Q is a query and D is the true database. This function is evidently ((t − 1)/n)-sensitive in D:
changing D changes each q(D) by at most 1/n. Now, note that sampling from Qt is simply sampling from
the exponential mechanism, with quality score r(D, q). Thus, the privacy cost of each sample in round t is
ε′t = 2η(t− 1)/n by Lemma 4.1.
By the standard composition theorem (Lemma 2.4), the total privacy cost is
ε =
T∑
t=1
sε′t =
2ηs
n
·
T∑
t=1
(t− 1) = ηT (T − 1)s
n
.
We next show that DualQuery is (ε, δ)-differentially private, for a much smaller ε.
Theorem 4.3. Let 0 < δ < 1. DualQuery is (ε, δ)-differentially private for
ε =
2η(T − 1)
n
·
[√
2s(T − 1) log(1/δ) + s(T − 1)
(
exp
(
2η(T − 1)
n
)
− 1
)]
.
Proof. Let ε be defined by the above equation. By the advanced composition theorem (Lemma 2.4), running
a composition of k ε′-private mechanisms is (ε, δ)-private for
ε =
√
2k log(1/δ)ε′ + kε′(exp(ε′)− 1).
Again, note that sampling from Qt is simply sampling from the exponential mechanism, with a (T − 1)/n-
sensitive quality score. Thus, the privacy cost of each sample is ε′ = 2η(T − 1)/n by Lemma 4.1. We plug
in k = s(T − 1) samples, as in the first round our samplings are 0-differentially private.
Accuracy
The accuracy proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show that “average query” formed from the samples is
close to the true weighted distribution Qt. We will need a standard Chernoff bound.
Lemma 4.4 (Chernoff bound). Let X1, . . . , XN be IID random variables with mean µ, taking values in
[0, 1]. Let X = 1N
∑
iXi be the empirical mean. Then,
Pr[|X − µ| > T ] < 2 exp(−NT 2/3)
for any T .
Lemma 4.5. Let β ∈ (0, 1), and let p be a distribution over queries. Suppose we draw
s =
48 log
(
2|X |
β
)
α2
samples {q̂i} from p, and let q be the aggregate query
q =
1
s
s∑
i=1
q̂i.
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Define the true weighted answer Q(x) to be
Q(x) =
|Q|∑
i=1
piqi(x).
Then with probability at least 1− β, we have |q(x)−Q(x)| < α/4 for every x ∈ X .
Proof. For any fixed x, note that q(x) is the average of random variables q̂1(x), . . . , q̂s(x). Also, note that
E[q(x)] = Q(x). Thus, by the Chernoff bound (Lemma 4.4) and our choice of s,
Pr[|q(x)−Q(x)| > α/4] < 2 exp(−sα2/48) = β/|X |.
By a union bound over x ∈ X , this equation holds for all x ∈ X with probability at least 1− β.
Next, we show that we compute an approximate equilibrium of the query release game. In particular,
the record best responses form a synthetic database that answer all queries in Q accurately. Note that our
algorithm doesn’t require an exact best response for the data player; an approximate best response will do.
Theorem 4.6. With probability at least 1−β, DualQuery finds a synthetic database that answers all queries
in Q within additive error α.
Proof. As discussed in Section 3, it suffices to show that the distribution of best responses x1, . . . , xT forms
is an α-approximate equilibrium strategy in the query release game. First, we set the number of samples
s according to in Lemma 4.5 with failure probability β/T . By a union bound over T rounds, sampling is
successful for every round with probability at least 1− β; condition on this event.
Since we are finding an α/4 approximate best response to the sampled aggregate query q, which differs
from the true distribution by at most α/4 (by Lemma 4.5), each xi is an α/4 + α/4 = α/2 approximate
best response to the true distribution Qt. Since q takes values in [0, 1], the payoffs are all in [−1, 1]. Hence,
Theorem 3.2 applies; setting T and η accordingly gives the result.
Remark 4.7. The guarantee in Theorem 4.6 may seem a little unusual, since the convention in the literature
is to treat ε, δ as inputs to the algorithm. We can do the same: from Theorem 4.3 and plugging in for T, η, s,
we have
ε =
4ηT
√
2sT log(1/δ)
n
=
256 log3/2 |Q|√6 log(1/δ) log(2|X |T/β)
α3n
.
Solving for α, we find
α = O
(
log1/2 |Q| log1/6(1/δ) log1/6(2|X |/γ)
n1/3ε1/3
)
,
for γ < β/T .
5 Case study: 3-way marginals
In our algorithm, the computationally difficult step is finding the data player’s approximate best response
against the query player’s distribution. As mentioned above, the form of this problem depends on the partic-
ular query classQ. In this section, we first discuss the optimization problem in general, and then specifically
for the well-studied class of marginal queries. For instance, in a database of medical information in bi-
nary attributes, a particular marginal query may be: What fraction of the patients are over 50, smoke, and
exercise?
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The best-response problem
Recall that the query release game has payoff A(x, q) defined by Equation (1); the data player tries to
minimize the payoff, while the query player tries to maximize it. If the query player has distribution Qt over
queries, the data player’s best response minimizes the expected loss:
argmin
x∈X
E
q←Qt
[q(D)− q(x)] .
To ensure privacy, the data player actually plays against the distribution of samples q̂1, . . . , q̂s. Since the
database D is fixed and q̂i are linear queries, the best-response problem is
argmin
x∈X
1
s
s∑
i=1
q̂i(D)− q̂i(x) = argmax
x∈X
s∑
i=1
q̂i(x).
By Theorem 4.6 it even suffices to find an approximate maximizer, in order to guarantee accuracy.
3-way marginal queries
To look at the precise form of the best-response problem, we consider 3-way marginal queries. We think of
records as having d binary attributes, so that the data universe |X | is all bitstrings of length d. We write xi
for x ∈ X to mean the ith bit of record x.
Definition 5.1. Let X = {0, 1}d. A 3-way marginal query is a linear query specified by 3 integers a 6= b 6=
c ∈ [d], taking values
qabc(x) =
{
1 : xa = xb = xc = 1
0 : otherwise.
Though everything we do will apply to general k-way marginals, for concreteness we will consider
k = 3: 3-way marginals.
Recall that the query class Q includes each query and its negation. So, we also have negated conjunc-
tions:
qabc(x) =
{
0 : xa = xb = xc = 1
1 : otherwise.
Given sampled conjunctions {ûi} and negated conjunctions {v̂i}, the best-response problem is
argmax
x∈X
∑
i
ûi(x) +
∑
j
v̂j(x).
In other words, this is a MAXCSP problem—we can associate a clause to each conjunction:
qabc ⇒ (xa ∧ xb ∧ xc) and qabc ⇒ (xa ∨ xb ∨ xc),
and we want to find x ∈ {0, 1}d satisfying as many clauses as possible.3
Since most solvers do not directly handle MAXCSP problems, we convert this optimization problem
into a more standard, integer program form. We introduce a variable xi for each literal xi, a variable ci
3Note that this is almost a MAX3SAT problem, except there are also “negative” clauses.
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for each sampled query, positive or negative. Then, we form the following integer program encoding to the
best-response MAXCSP problem.
max
∑
i
ci
such that xa + xb + xc ≥ 3ci for each ûi = qabc
(1− xa) + (1− xb) + (1− xc) ≥ cj for each v̂j = qabc
xi, ci ∈ {0, 1}
Note that the expressions xi, 1− xi encode the literals xi, xi, respectively, and the clause variable ci can be
set to 1 exactly when the respective clause is satisfied. Thus, the objective is the number of satisfied clauses.
The resulting integer program can be solved using any standard solver; we use CPLEX.
6 Case study: Parity queries
In this section, we show how to apply DualQuery to another well-studied class of queries: parities. Each
specified by a subset S of features, these queries measure the number of records with an even number of bits
on in S compared to the number of records with an odd number of bits on in S.
Definition 6.1. Let X = {−1,+1}d. A k-wise parity query is a linear query specified by a subset of features
S ⊆ [d] with |S| = k, taking values
qS(x) =
{
+1 : even number of xi = +1 for i ∈ S
−1 : otherwise.
Like before, we can define a negated k-wise parity query:
qS(x) =
{
+1 : odd number of xi = +1 for i ∈ S
−1 : otherwise.
For the remainder, we specialize to k = 3. Given sampled parity queries {ûi} and negated parity queries
{v̂i}, the best response problem is to find the record x ∈ X that takes value 1 on as many of these queries
as possible. We can construct an integer program for this task: introduce d variables xi, and two variables
cq, dq for each sampled query. The following integer program encodes the best-response problem.
max
∑
i
ci
such that
∑
j
∑
p∈Sj
xp = 2di + ci − 1 for each ûi = qS∑
j
∑
p∈Sj
xp = 2di + ci for each v̂i = qS
xp, ci ∈ {0, 1}, di ∈ {0, 1, 2}
Consider the (non-negated) parity queries first. The idea is that each variable ci can be set to 1 exactly when
the corresponding parity query takes value 1, i.e., when x has an even number of bits in S set to +1. Since
|S| ≤ 3, this even number will either be 0 or 2, hence is equal to 2di for di ∈ {0, 1}. A similar argument
holds for the negated parity queries.
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Dataset Size Attributes Binary attributes
Adult 30162 14 235
KDD99 494021 41 396
Netflix 480189 17,770 17,770
Figure 1: Test Datasets
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Figure 2: Average max error of (ε, 0.001)-private DualQuery on 500,000 3-way marginals versus ε.
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Figure 3: Error and runtime of (1, 0.001)-private DualQuery on KDD99 versus number of queries.
We evaluate DualQuery on a large collection of 3-way marginal queries on several real datasets (Fig-
ure 1) and high dimensional synthetic data. Adult (census data) and KDD99 (network packet data) are from
the UCI repository [2], and have a mixture of discrete (but non-binary) and continuous attributes, which we
discretize into binary attributes. We also use the (in)famous Netflix [29] movie ratings dataset, with more
than 17,000 binary attributes. More precisely, we can consider each attribute (corresponding to a movie) to
be 1 if a user has watched that movie, and 0 otherwise.
Rather than set the parameters as in Algorithm 2, we experiment with a range of parameters. For instance,
we frequently run for fewer rounds (lower T ) and take fewer samples (lower s). As such, the accuracy guar-
antee (Theorem 4.6) need not hold for our parameters. However, we find that our algorithm gives good error,
often much better than predicted. In all cases, our parameters satisfy the privacy guarantee Theorem 4.3.
We will measure the accuracy of the algorithm using two measures: average error and max error. Given
a collection of queries Q = {q1, . . . , qk}, input database D and the synthetic database D̂ output by our
13
0	  
0.01	  
0.02	  
0.03	  
0.04	  
0.05	  
0.06	  
0.07	  
0.08	  
0.09	  
50	   500	   5000	   50000	   500000	  
Synthe'c:	  Average	  Average	  Error	  
0	  
0.05	  
0.1	  
0.15	  
0.2	  
0.25	  
0.3	  
50	   500	   5000	   50000	   500000	  
Synthe'c:	  Average	  Max	  Error	  
0	  
100	  
200	  
300	  
400	  
500	  
600	  
700	  
800	  
900	  
1000	  
50	   500	   5000	   50000	   500000	  
Synthe'c:	  Average	  Run'me(secs)	  
Figure 4: Error and runtime of (1, 0.001)-private DualQuery on 100,000 3-way marginal queries versus
number of attributes.
Figure 5: Comparison of the accuracy performance between DualQuery and MWEM on a low-dimensional
dataset with 17 attributes. Both algorithms answer 10,000 queries for the Adult dataset under (ε, 0)-
differential privacy, where ε ranges from 1 to 5. In both plots, we show the average and maximum error
as a function of the privacy parameter ε.
query release algorithm, the average error is defined as
1
|Q|
∑
j
|qj(D)− qj(D̂)|
and the max error is defined as
max
j
|qj(D)− qj(D̂)|.
We will run the algorithm multiple times and take the average of both error statistics. While our algorithm
uses “negated” 3-way marginal queries internally, all error figures are for normal, “positive” 3-way marginal
queries only.
Accuracy
We evaluate the accuracy of the algorithm on 500,000 3-way marginals on Adult, KDD99 and Netflix.
We report maximum error in Figure 2, averaged over 5 runs. (Marginal queries have range [0, 1], so error
1 is trivial.) Again, all error figures are for normal, “positive” 3-way marginal queries only. The runs are
(ε, 0.001)-differentially private, with ε ranging from 0.25 to 5.4
4Since our privacy analysis follows from Lemma 2.4, our algorithm actually satisfies (ε, δ)-privacy for smaller values of δ.
For example, our algorithm is also (
√
2ε, δ′)-private for δ′ = 10−6. Similarly, we could choose any arbitrarily small value of δ,
and Lemma 2.4 would tell us that our algorithm was (ε′, δ)-differentially private for an appropriate value ε′, which depends only
sub-logarithmically on 1/δ.
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For the Adult and KDD99 datasets, we set step size η = 2.0, sample size s = 1000 while varying the
number of steps T according to the privacy budget ε, using the formula from Theorem 4.3. For the Netflix
dataset, we adopt the same heuristic except we set s to be 5000.
The accuracy improves noticeably when ε increases from 0.25 to 1 across 3 datasets, and the im-
provement diminishes gradually with larger ε. With larger sizes, both KDD99 and Netflix datasets allow
DualQuery to run with more steps and get significantly better error.
Scaling to More Queries
Next, we evaluate accuracy and runtime when varying the number of queries. We use a set of 40,000 to
2 million randomly generated marginals Q on the KDD99 dataset and run DualQuery with (1, 0.001)-
privacy. For all experiments, we use the same set of parameters: η = 1.2, T = 170 and s = 1750. By
Theorem 4.3, each run of the experiment satisfies (1, 0.001)-differential privacy. These parameters give
stable performance as the query class Q grows. As shown in Figure 3, both average and max error remain
mostly stable, demonstrating improved error compared to simpler perturbation approaches. For example,
the Laplace mechanism’s error growth rate is O(
√|Q|) under (ε, δ)-differential privacy. The runtime grows
almost linearly in the number of queries, since we maintain a distribution over all the queries.
Scaling to Higher Dimensional Data
We also evaluate accuracy and runtime behavior for data dimension ranging from 50 to 512,000. We evaluate
DualQuery under (1, 0.001)-privacy on 100,000 3-way marginals on synthetically generated datasets. We
report runtime, max, and average error over 3 runs in Figure 4; note the logarithmic scale for attributes axis.
We do not include query evaluation in our time measurements—this overhead is common to all approaches
that answer a set of queries.
When generating the synthetic data, one possibility is to set each attribute to be 0 or 1 uniformly at
random. However, this generates very uniform synthetic data: a record satisfies any 3-way marginal with
probability 1/8, so most marginals will have value near 1/8. To generate more challenging and realistic
data, we pick a separate bias pi ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random for each attribute i. For each data point, we
then set attribute i to be 1 independently with probability equal to pi. As a result, different 3-way marginals
have different answers on our synthetic data.
For parameters, we fix step size η to be 0.4, and increase the sample size s with the dimension of
the data (from 200 to 50,000) at the expense of running fewer steps. For these parameters, our algorithm
is (1, 0.001)-differentially private by Theorem 4.3. With this set of parameters, we are able to obtain 8%
average error in an average of 10 minutes of runtime, excluding query evaluation.
Comparison with a Simple Baseline
When interpreting our results, it is useful to compare them to a simple baseline solution as a sanity check.
Since our real data sets are sparse, we would expect the answer of most queries to be small. A natural
baseline is the zeros data set, where all records have all attributes set to 0.
For the experiments reporting max-error on real datasets, shown in Figure 2, the accuracy of DualQuery
out-performs the zeros data set: the zeros data set has a max error of 1 on both Adult and KDD99 data sets,
and a max error of 0.51 on the Netflix data set. For the experiments reporting average error in Figure 3,
the zeros data set also has worse accuracy—it has an average error of 0.11 on the KDD dataset, whereas
DualQuery has an average error below 0.01.
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For synthetic data we can also compare to the zeros dataset, but it is a poor benchmark since the dataset is
typically not sparse. Hence, we also compare to a uniform data set containing one of each possible record.5
Recall that we generate our synthetic data by first selecting a bias pi uniformly at random from [0, 1] for
each attribute i, then setting each record’s attribute i to be 1 with probability pi (independently across the
attributes).
Given this data generation model, we can analytically compute the expected average error on both bench-
marks. Consider a query q on literals a, b, c. The probability that q evaluates to 1 on a randomly generated
record is pa · pb · pc. So, the expected value of q when evaluated on the synthetic data is
E[pa · pb · pc] = 0.125
since pa, pb, pc are drawn independently and uniformly from [0, 1].
On the zeros data set, q takes value 0 unless it is of the form ¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c, when it takes value 1. If we
average over all queries q, this occurs on exactly 1/8 of the queries. Thus, the expected average error of the
zeros database is
1/8 · E[1− pa · pb · pc] + 7/8 · E[pa · pb · pc] = 7/32 = 0.21875.
Similarly, the max-error will tend to 1 as the size of the data set and number of queries performed grows
large. In practice, the max-error in our experiments was above 0.98.
We can perform a similar calculation with respect the uniform benchmark. Fix any query q on three
literals a, b, and c. Every query q evaluates to exactly 1/8 on the uniform benchmark. Thus, the expected
error of the uniform benchmark on q is
E[|1/8− pa · pb · pc|],
where pa, pb, pc are drawn independently and randomly from [0, 1]. This error is
E[|1/8− pa · pb · pc|] = 1/256 · (7 + 18 ln 2 + 2(ln 8)3) ≈ 0.11,
by a direct calculation.
Similarly, the max-error will tend to 1 − 1/8 = 0.875 as the size of the data set and number of queries
performed grows large. In practice, the max-error in our experiments was above 0.85. Thus, we see that
DualQuery outperforms both of these baseline comparisons on synthetic data.
Comparison with MWEM
Finally, we give a brief comparison between the algorithm MWEM of Hardt et al. [20] and DualQuery
in terms of the accuracy performance. We tested both algorithms on the Adult dataset with a selection of
17 attributes to answer 10,000 queries. The accuracy performance of MWEM is better than DualQuery on
this low-dimensional dataset (shown in Figure 5). Note that this matches with theoretical guarantees—our
theoretical accuracy bounds are worse than MWEM as shown by Hardt and Rothblum [19], Hardt et al. [20].
More generally, for low dimensional datasets for which it is possible to maintain a distribution over records,
MWEM likely remains the state of the art. Our work complements MWEM by allowing private data analysis
on higher-dimensional data sets. In this experiment, we fix the step size of DualQuery to be η = 0.4, and set
the sample size and number of steps to be (s, T ) = (35, 47), (40, 62), (45, 71), (50, 78), (55, 83) to achieve
privacy levels of ε = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 respectively. For the instantiation of MWEM, we set the number of steps to
be T = 15 (see [20] for more details of the algorithm).
5Note that this is the distribution that the MWEM algorithm starts with initially, so this corresponds to the error of MWEM after
running it for 0 rounds (running it for a non-zero number of rounds is not feasible given our data sizes)
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Methodology
In this section, we discuss our experimental setup in more detail.
Implementation details. The implementation is written in OCaml, using the CPLEX constraint solver.
We ran the experiments on a mid-range desktop machine with a 4-core Intel Xeon processor and 12 Gb of
RAM. Heuristically, we set a timeout for each CPLEX call to 20 seconds, accepting the best current solution
if we hit the timeout. For the experiments shown, the timeout was rarely reached.
Data discretization. We discretize KDD99 and Adult datasets into binary attributes by mapping each
possible value of a discrete attribute to a new binary feature. We bucket continuous attributes, mapping each
bucket to a new binary feature. We also ensure that our randomly generated 3-way marginal queries are
sensible (i.e., they don’t require an original attribute to take two different values).
Setting free attributes. Since the collection of sampled queries may not involve all of the attributes,
CPLEX often finds solutions that leave some attributes unspecified. We set these free attributes heuristically:
for real data, we set the attributes to 0 as these datasets are fairly sparse;6 for synthetic data, we set attributes
to 0 or 1 uniformly at random.7
Parameter tuning. DualQuery has three parameters that can be set in a wide variety of configurations
without altering the privacy guarantee (Theorem 4.3): number of iterations (T ), number of samples (s), and
learning rate (η), which controls how aggressively to update the distribution. For a fixed level of ε and δ,
there are many feasible private parameter settings.
Performance depends strongly on the choice of parameters: T has an obvious impact—runtime scales
linearly with T . Other parameters have a more subtle impact on performance—increasing s increases the
number of constraints in the integer program for CPLEX, for example. We have investigated a range of
parameters, and for the experiments we have used informal heuristics coming from our observations. We
briefly describe some of them here. For sparse datasets like the ones in Figure 1, with larger η (in the range
of 1.5 to 2.0) and smaller s (in the same order as the number of attributes), we obtain good accuracy when
we set the free attributes to be 0. But for denser data like our synthetic data, we get better accuracy when we
have smaller η (around 0.4) and set the free attributes randomly. As for runtime, we observe that CPLEX
could finish running quickly (in seconds) when the sample size is in about the same range as the number of
attributes (factor of 2 or 3 different).
Ultimately, our parameters are chosen on a case-by-case basis for each data-set, which is not differ-
entially private. Parameter setting should be done under differential privacy for a truly realistic evaluation
(which we do not do). Overall, we do not know of an approach that is both principled and practical to handle
this issue end-to-end; private parameter tuning is an area of active research (see e.g., Chaudhuri and Vinterbo
[8]).
6The adult and KDD99 datasets are sparse due to the way we discretize the data; for the Netflix dataset, most users have only
viewed a tiny fraction of the 17,000 movies.
7For a more principled way to set these free attributes, the sparsity of the dataset could be estimated at a small additional cost to
privacy.
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8 Discussion and conclusion
We have given a new private query release mechanism that can handle datasets with dimensionality multiple
orders of magnitude larger than what was previously possible. Indeed, it seems we have not reached the
limits of our approach—even on synthetic data with more than 500,000 attributes, DualQuery continues to
generate useful answers with about 30 minutes of overhead on top of query evaluation (which by itself is on
the scale of hours). We believe that DualQuery makes private analysis of high dimensional data practical
for the first time.
There is still plenty of room for further research. For example, can our approach be improved to match
the optimal theoretical accuracy guarantees for query release? We do not know of any fundamental obstacles,
but we do not know how to give a better analysis of our current methods. The projection-based approach of
Nikolov et al. [30], Dwork et al. [15] seems promising—it achieves theoretically optimal bounds, and like
in our approach, the “hard” projection step does not need to be solved privately. It deserves to be studied
empirically. On the other hand this approach does not produce synthetic data.
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